



Director of
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Contents

Situation Reports

Afghanistan.	1
Iran	3

25X1

Briefs and Comments

Portugal: <i>Communist Leverage</i>	6
North Yemen: <i>Cabinet Shuffle</i>	7

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Special Analysis

Central Africa: <i>Impact of Chad's Civil War</i> . . .	8
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SITUATION REPORTS

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AFGHANISTAN

Kabul is filled with rumors of new or impending dissident activity, but the capital remained calm yesterday with military units apparently on no special alert. The situation in Herat remains unclear, but President Taraki's government is believed to be in control of all major military installations in that area. Both Kabul and Moscow, meanwhile, have become more strident in their denunciations of "imperialists" and Afghanistan's neighbors for allegedly instigating the insurgent activity.

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The Iranians are the targets of the sharpest Afghan attacks for their alleged role in stirring up dissidents in the Herat area. On Tuesday, the government declared the Iranian consul in the city persona non grata. In Kabul, the government organized anti-Iranian demonstrations in response to earlier demonstrations before the Afghan Embassy in Tehran.

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Recent speeches by Iranian religious leaders denouncing the authorities in Kabul for their "devilish" treatment of Muslims have particularly incensed the Afghan Government.

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A Pakistani Government spokesman issued another denial yesterday that Afghan insurgents were operating from Pakistan, as charged by both Kabul and Moscow. The

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Pakistanis probably will be embarrassed by a news conference held by an Afghan dissident leader in Pakistan; he thanked the government for its humanitarian assistance but asked for official Pakistani support for the insurgents in their continuing fight to overthrow Taraki.

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Soviet Activity

Soviet propaganda continues to hit hard at the theme of alleged foreign involvement and support for the current unrest in Afghanistan. *Pravda*, for example, yesterday carried an authoritative A. Petrov piece lashing out against the foreign supporters of Afghan exiles operating from states bordering Afghanistan. As was the case in *Pravda's* I. Aleksandrov article last Sunday, most of Petrov's wrath is reserved for the Pakistanis, but Petrov also says flatly that China is aiding the insurgents and accuses the US, the UK, West Germany, Iran, Egypt, and "other reactionary Arab regimes" of spreading false rumors and disinformation aimed at encouraging antigovernment forces inside Afghanistan.

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IRAN

//Fighting intensified yesterday between dissident Kurds and besieged government forces in the capital of Kordestan Province. In the far northwest, leftist Azarbayjani autonomists are said to be organizing on a broad scale.//

Unidentified Kurdish dissidents who initiated armed action on Monday still control Sanandaj. They hold the radio-television station, police barracks, and the provincial government headquarters. Fighting around barracks of the 28th Infantry Division, which is being reinforced and supplied by air, has resulted in at least 80 deaths--some estimates put the figure at 500--with many more wounded. The government has been unsuccessfully using tanks, helicopter gunships, and fighter planes to try to suppress the fighting.

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Radio Tehran has twice carried statements from Chief of Staff Qarani designed to stem the inflow of armed irregulars responding to calls for aid broadcast by the local radio station before the Kurds took it. Tehran also has repeatedly broadcast calls for calm from Ayatollahs Khomeini and Taleghani. Government and religious delegations, including the Defense and Interior Ministers as well as Taleghani and Ayatollah Beheshti--both close Khomeini aides--went to Sanandaj yesterday to discuss Kurdish "problems" and "demands." Similar delegations last month failed to moderate or delay Kurdish demands for autonomy.

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[redacted]
Ambassador Sullivan on Tuesday after returning from eastern Azarbayjan, "autonomy committees" are being organized there in every town and village. The source believes they will easily be able "to proclaim autonomy, independence, or a people's republic."

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The recent upheaval in Kordestan Province, autonomist sentiments in Baluchestan and among Turkomen, as well as hints of restiveness near Bandar Abbas were prompted in part by the alienation of these groups--all Suhni Muslims--from the Shia majority and the essentially Shia revolution. Their unrest is likely to intensify, reinforcing their isolation and posing an increasingly serious problem for the central government.

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PORTUGAL: Communist Leverage

Portugal's political situation gives the Communist Party considerable leverage in exploiting the political turmoil generated by last week's resignation of a senior Agriculture Ministry official. The Communists want to stop the government's attacks on their strongholds in southern agricultural and industrial regions. [REDACTED]

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Communist activities against the government have so far been routine. Last week's orderly demonstration in Lisbon by around 100,000 blue-collar workers capped a month of lesser protests in other parts of the country. The workers' complaints, as usual, centered on government transfers of collectivized lands to private owners, the high cost of living, and plans to limit wage increases to 18 percent. [REDACTED]

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Though the Communists lack sufficient strength to oust Prime Minister Mota Pinto by themselves, their aggressive labor posture presents a major challenge to the Socialists and Social Democrats who jointly sponsor Portugal's second labor confederation--the fledgling General Workers' Union. The Socialists, in particular, can ill afford to take a less firm stance without losing labor's support, and without their tacit support Mota Pinto could not survive. [REDACTED]

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Both the Socialists and Social Democrats have responded with strong pro-labor stands in recent efforts to distance themselves further from the government. If Mota Pinto does not relent, the Socialists and Social Democrats would be pressed to back their rhetoric with censure motions. [REDACTED]

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In any event, the Communists stand to benefit. As the only party to vote against the government's investiture, they are least vulnerable to a public backlash that might accompany the government's fall. If Mota Pinto stays and makes the concessions to labor, the Communists could expect their share of the reward. [REDACTED]

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NORTH YEMEN: Cabinet Shuffle

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25X1 [REDACTED] President Salih removed several cabinet officials yesterday because of his dissatisfaction with their performance during the recent border fighting with South Yemen. Two of the ousted ministers--Foreign Minister Asnaj and Information Minister Basindwa, both exiled South Yemenis--were advocates of a hard line toward Aden, and their removal may also be intended as a gesture toward South Yemen. Salih installed a prominent northern tribal leader as deputy prime minister, apparently as a reward to the tribes for their support during the fighting. The removal of some ineffective ministers may strengthen Salih's position in the near term. The increase in the influence of the tribes may, however, prove 25X1 damaging in the long run; tribal leaders have traditionally sought to keep the central government weak. [REDACTED]

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

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Central Africa: Impact of Chad's Civil War

The civil war in Chad worries neighboring black African countries, which are also vulnerable to fragmentation along ethnic and religious lines. Nigeria and the pro-Western governments in Niger, Cameroon, and the Central African Empire are particularly wary of the radicalism and the Islamic zeal of Libyan leader Qadhafi, who is deeply involved in Chad and has ambitions elsewhere south of the Sahara.

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These states recognize that the old elite--southern-based, Christianized, and French-oriented--will never regain its hold in Chad. They realize too that rebel Muslims will play important roles in any new central government. As a result of a recent conference in Nigeria of all Chadian parties, troops from Nigeria are to play a peacekeeping role in Ndjamena under an agreement that calls for the creation of a "transitional union government" by Chad's warring factions that is to govern until a new national election can be held.

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What Chad's neighbors fear most is the emergence of a Muslim government strongly influenced by Libya. They suspect such a regime could consolidate its power only by repressing the southern Christians, which could bring border security problems and a destabilizing influx of refugees. In the longer run, Chad could become a base for Libyan activism elsewhere in the region. Many political leaders in these countries tend to exaggerate the Libyan threat, but there is enough evidence of past Libyan subversion to make their fears credible.

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Libyan Ambitions in Central Africa

Libyan support for Chadian Muslim rebels began in 1973, and Libya has occupied a strip of Chadian territory it claims--the Aozou Strip. Qadhafi may believe a compliant Chad could be a base for undermining his Muslim enemies to the east--Sudan and Egypt. Even if Qadhafi's interest in the black African states is secondary, he

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has devoted considerable attention to some of them with his encouragement of "progressive" forces and disruption of pro-Western regimes. [REDACTED]

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Niger

President Kountche's five-year-old military government has tried to maintain good relations with Libya--primarily to avoid giving Qadhafi any pretext for meddling in Niger's affairs. Libya apparently supported a coup attempt in 1975 against Kountche and refuses to recognize the validity of Niger's northeastern border. Uranium deposits in this area give Niger the fifth largest uranium reserves in the world. [REDACTED]

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Although Niger's population is predominantly Muslim, the country does have potentially serious ethnic divisions. The small Djerma tribe has dominated the government since independence, and it was a revolt by members of the large Hausa group in 1975 that the Libyans apparently sought to exploit. Since then, the Libyans have tried to force Libyan citizenship on nomadic tribesmen who roam the desert in the area of the disputed northeastern border. [REDACTED]

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Last year, as the fighting escalated in Chad, Niger began building up its modest military establishment acquiring transport planes from the US and armored cars from France. [REDACTED]

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Nigeria

Head of State Obasanjo, a non-Muslim from southern Nigeria, is uneasy about Libya's role in Chad because he believes Nigeria's large Muslim population--at least 47 percent of its 70 million or more people--may be susceptible to Libyan intrigue under the more fluid political environment of civilian rule planned for later this year. [REDACTED]

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The extent of Libyan activity in predominantly Muslim northern Nigeria is difficult to document. It is clear, however, that Libya has offered large sums to Nigerian Islamic organizations, ostensibly for religious purposes, and is trying to develop contacts at several northern universities. Many Nigerians assume that Libya is providing money to certain northern politicians. Some

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Nigerians think the Libyans are encouraging "progressive" Muslims to subvert the conservative Muslim establishment, with an ultimate objective of a separate Islamic republic in northern Nigeria. [REDACTED]

Cameroon

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Since gaining independence in 1960 under the leadership of President Ahidjo, a Muslim Fulani from the country's north, Cameroon has achieved a degree of stability and economic progress unusual in this part of Africa. [REDACTED]

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Cameroonians are concerned, however, by what they see as the threat of subversion from abroad. Already nervous about the Cuban and Soviet presence to the south in Equatorial Guinea, Congo, and Angola, they see the turmoil in Chad as a new reflection of Soviet activity, with Libya acting as a Soviet surrogate. Their fears are colored by their experience in putting down a Communist-backed insurgency in the 1960s. [REDACTED]

Central African Empire

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After the apparently spontaneous disorders in January, Emperor Bokassa is acutely sensitive to events in Chad and fears they could have repercussions posing even greater threats to his fragile regime. His decision to break relations with Libya last month reflects a suspicion that Libya was somehow behind the disorders in January and may be fostering more trouble. Bokassa, however, may well lack any hard evidence of Libyan intrigue. [REDACTED]

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Relations between the two countries have gone from one extreme to the other since 1976 when Bokassa briefly embraced the Islamic faith and signed several economic agreements with Libya, agreements that have resulted in an important source of financial support for Bokassa. [REDACTED]

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
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